


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*J. I. Chapman
from A*

THE
INTELLECTUAL AND ETHICAL VALUE
OF
CLASSICAL EDUCATION

BY
James
J. ADAM M.A.


FELLOW AND TUTOR OF EMMANUEL COLLEGE CAMBRIDGE

CAMBRIDGE
DEIGHTON BELL & CO.

1895

[From the "*Emmanuel College Magazine*," Vol. VII. No. 1.]


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τοῖς
φιλτάτοις ἐμοὶ
συνεστίοις τε καὶ συντραπέζοις,
οὐκ ἀσχήμου πόλεως πολίταις

ἙΜΜΑΝΟΥΗΛ,

τόδε τὸ βιβλιδάριον
εὔμενές παρὰ εὔμενοῦς
κεχαρίσθω.



εἰ μὲν φιλοσοφητέον, φιλοσοφητέον, καὶ εἰ μὴ φιλοσοφη-
τέον, φιλοσοφητέον· πάντως ἄρα φιλοσοφητέον.

(ARISTOTLE.)

p 47065

The Intellectual and Ethical Value of Classical Education.

A former student of Classics at the University, who is now earning an honourable if somewhat scanty livelihood by teaching Greek and Latin grammar somewhere in the provinces, once remarked to the writer of this Essay, à propos of the curriculum of classical study here, "*Cui bono?* When I die, I should like to have the words *Cui bono?* engraved upon my coffin." The same inquiry, expressed perhaps with less playfully pathetic exaggeration, must occasionally be addressed to every teacher of the Classics. It is a question which ought not to be evaded, whether it comes from the advocate of some rival scheme of Education, or from the dejected pupil vainly struggling to descry the wood among the trees. A variety of answers has often been returned¹, and not without good reason, because the answer necessarily differs according to the status of the questioner. It would be inappropriate, for example, to offer the same answer to a Senior Wrangler who is urging the rival claims of mathematics, to a boy who is learning Latin for

¹ Several of them are discussed (and somewhat severely handled) by Professor Sidgwick in Farrar's "Essays on a Liberal Education," pp. 81

the purposes of an apothecary, and to a classical student at Oxford or Cambridge. We are therefore at liberty to attempt a partial reply, addressed in the main to those who are familiar with the routine of classical study as it is pursued in the Universities. It is in these that classical education is carried to its highest pitch; and consequently any theory of classical study at the Universities, if even approximately true, will be at once more fundamental and more final than one whose scope is limited to an earlier stage in the intellectual and moral training of the student. If classical education is to retain its hold upon the Universities,—and the recent development of other studies has but strengthened its position¹,—it must be prepared to invite the student into more spacious and more fruitful fields of inquiry than can profitably be worked at School. The present Essay is only an attempt to sketch in outline what seems to the author a true apology and theory of the place and proper function of classical study in a University.

Let us begin by availing ourselves of a distinction of long standing—a distinction at once popular and scientific—the distinction between what is called a liberal and what is called a professional education. The distinction was familiar to the ancients; in Plato's day, the teachers of liberal education were the philosophers and dramatists and artists, whereas professional training was supplied by the Sophists.

Speaking generally, we may say that the primary object of a professional education, now as in antiquity, is not to develop

¹ The following passage from Mark Pattison's *Essays* (Vol. I p. 440) will shew that such a result might have been anticipated, if only—as we shall endeavour to shew—the study of the classics is essentially a liberal education. “It is a well-established fact in the history of liberal education, that the periods in which the history and the practice of it have made the greatest improvement, have been periods immediately succeeding some of the great discoveries in science, or some of the great impulses to the study of facts.”

the mental and moral qualities of the pupil for their own sakes, but to enable him to make his living—to convert, in other words, his brains into money. Training of this kind may or may not incidentally advance the liberal education of the learner, but in its essence it is altogether distinct from liberal education, because its end and aim are different.

To give an exhaustive definition of liberal education lies beyond our present scope, but we will mention two points in which the man of liberal education—ὁ πεπαιδευμένος, in the strict sense of the word παιδεία—differs from the man whose education is otherwise.

In the first place, liberal education implies the power of intellectual sympathy. The faculty of entering into another man's thoughts, of appreciating his point of view, and recognising the inherent necessity of his creed and conduct, belongs only to the man who is liberally educated. In dealing with their fellow-men, others are tyrants and persecutors; he alone is tolerant. Nor is his intellectual sympathy confined to the circle in which he moves. He can enter into the thoughts and feelings which prevail or have prevailed in another nation and another age, and move among the mighty minds of every generation as if they were his kindred. Liberal education communicates this faculty of intellectual sympathy because, being itself rather the Form than the Matter of knowledge, it enables us in dealing with the thoughts of others to make them our own by clothing them with the form which we already know. From this point of view liberal education is to every other kind of learning just what Logic is to the Sciences.

In the second place, liberal education involves the training of the character no less than of the intellect. It aims at the περιπαγωγή of the entire soul—ψυχῆς περιπαγωγή, ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τιος ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθινὴν τοῦ ὄντος οὐσα ἐπάνοδος—a spiritual revolution, in which the soul ascends from twilight to the noon-

day of reality¹. True, the educator addresses himself to the intellect of his pupil first and foremost, but he does not desire, nor is it, from his point of view, even possible, to influence the intellect without affecting the will and character. He addresses himself in short, not to the intellect alone, but to the whole man through the intellect. His attitude may be described in the words of Plato²: ὁ δέ γε νῦν λόγος—σημαίνει ταύτην τὴν ἐνοῦσαν ἐκάστου δύναμιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ ὄργανον ᾧ καταμανθάνει ἕκαστος, οἷον εἰ ὕμμα μὴ δυνατὸν ἦν ἄλλως ἢ ξὺν ὄλῳ τῷ σώματι στρέφειν πρὸς τὸ φανὸν ἐκ τοῦ σκοτώδους, οὕτω ξὺν ὄλῳ τῇ ψυχῇ ἐκ τοῦ γιγνομένου περιакτέον εἶναι, ἕως ἂν εἰς τὸ ὄν καὶ τοῦ ὄντος τὸ φανότατον δυνατὴ γένηται ἀνασχέσθαι θεωμένη: "Our present reasoning indicates that this faculty" (meaning νοῦς or reason) "dwelling in the soul of each individual, this organ wherewith each one learns, cannot be turned round from gazing on the false and fleeting, and rendered able to endure the contemplation of truth and the brightest part thereof, except by turning the whole soul round—even as if it were impossible to turn the bodily eye from darkness to light except by turning the whole body round along with it."

Confining ourselves then for the present to these two features of a liberal education—its power to produce intellectual sympathy, and its effect in moulding the character through the intellect—let us inquire whether the study of the Classics can justly be regarded as a liberal education, when judged by these two canons.

What *is* Classical Education? We may say briefly that it is the transportation of the mind into the ways of thought and feeling which prevailed in ancient Greece and Rome. This is a high ideal; but nothing short of this will do—nothing short of this has been aimed at by Humanists in every generation. Macaulay used to define a scholar as the

¹ Plato Rep. VII 521 C.

² Rep. VII 518 C.

man who could read his Plato with his feet upon the fender; but that is not enough. It was said of Dr Kennedy that when he took a class in Demosthenes he did not teach Demosthenes, he *was* Demosthenes. It is in the same sense that the true scholar always identifies himself with the author whom he reads. In proportion as he grasps the full meaning of the Greek, he transcends the limitations of time and place, and is carried back into the world wherein his author lived and moved. The soul of Homer, of Plato, of Sophocles, of Virgil passes into him; he looks out with other eyes upon another world; and the very music of their language seems to him the spontaneous utterance of thoughts that are not theirs, but his. Nor is it only in the reading of authors that such a transportation of the soul is necessary in order to derive the full benefit of a classical training. The writing of Greek and Latin prose and verse is truly valuable only in so far as it enables us to see with the eyes, hear with the ears, and think with the minds, of the ancients. No man ever wrote like Plato or like Cicero unless the spirit of ancient philosophy or oratory dwelt within him at the time. The same is true of the study of classical syntax and grammar. The Grammarian is of little value to the Humanist if he does not shew him what particular habit of mind or feeling prompted the ancients to express themselves in such and such a way. It has often been observed that language stands to thought as form does to matter. Now if there is one thing more characteristic of Greek civilisation than any other, whether we consider its religion, its philosophy, its art, or its politics, it is the intimate union which everywhere existed between matter and form. In dealing with the relation of language to thought, Plato expressed his consciousness of this union by describing language as the image (*εἰδωλον*) of thought, and thought as nothing but the inner language of the soul conversing with herself. This is the justification of that laborious

study of words, and syntax, and idiom, which no serious student of the Classics can afford to neglect. We desire to recreate the world of Plato and Sophocles, to see what they saw, as they saw it, think what they thought, as they thought it; and in the wonderful language which they spoke, there is no shade of expression, however delicate, no particle, however trivial, in which there may not lurk a subtle force, to miss which is to fall short of apprehending the full significance of ancient life and thought. We need hardly add that History and Archæology lose half their charm and all their educational value unless they teach us how the ancients lived and felt. Modern historians sometimes forget that History is one of the Muses: the ancients seldom did. It is not every archæologist who can see, like Keats, the whole soul of Greek antiquity in a Grecian urn:

“O Attic shape! Fair attitude! with brede
Of marble men and maidens overwrought,
With forest branches and the trodden weed;
Thou, silent form! dost tease us out of thought
As doth eternity! Cold Pastoral!
When old age shall this generation waste,
Thou shalt remain, in midst of other woe
Than ours, a friend to man, to whom thou say’st,
Beauty is truth, truth beauty, that is all
Ye know on Earth, and all ye need to know.”

δεῖ δέ που τελευτᾶν τὴν μουσικὴν εἰς τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ ἔρωτικά, says Plato¹. If the love of beauty and truth is the ultimate goal of all education—and if the outward beauty of form and shape, whether it appeals to us through language or through sculpture, is but the expression of the spiritual loveliness within,—then our study of antiquity should be psychological. Classical study, in point of fact, so far as it is an educative discipline, is a department of Psychology, the crown of sciences, according to Professor Bain.

¹ Rep. III 403 C.

We may take it then that education in the Classics involves, or should involve, the transportation of the mind into the sphere in which the ancients lived and thought and felt.

It remains to ask, Does such a transportation fulfil the two conditions of liberal education which we have laid down? Does it promote intellectual sympathy? Does it refine and strengthen the character?

Before describing his curriculum of education, Plato lays it down, in the seventh book of the *Republic*¹, that whatever presents us with two opposite sensations at one and the same time is calculated to stimulate the intellect. By an extension of this principle we may say that any department of study which continually presents us with ideas and emotions antagonistic to the age in which we live tends forcibly to awaken our intellectual activities and foster intellectual sympathy.

Now this is precisely what the study of classical, and especially of Greek, antiquity preeminently does. The literatures of Greece and Rome are the only great and easily accessible literatures which remain to us before the foundation of Christianity and modern civilisation. In reading Greek and Latin authors, if only we read them intelligently, we stumble throughout almost every page upon some mode of expression, upon some idea, foreign to the fashion of to-day. The effect is, or should be, what Socrates described as an intellectual torpedo-shock, similar to that produced upon the body by contact with the torpedo or cramp-fish. You are stunned at first—or, as Plato might say, dazed, and rendered giddy, by the contradiction; but the paralysis soon disappears, and your intellect begins to resolve the contradiction into a higher unity, involving a broader, more charitable, and for that reason more profound, conception of human nature and human life. “The main object” says Mr Bowen, in ‘Essays

¹ 524 D.

on a Liberal Education'¹—"the main object of seeing distinctly what Plato and Cicero thought, is that one may be able to look on all questions, not only on the side which they now present, but on that also which they turned to observers long ago ; to gain, as it were, a kind of intellectual parallax in contemplating the problems of life."

Let us give one or two examples of the kind of contradictions which we have in view. We shall not attempt to resolve them ; to do so would be to stray into the deepest questions of philosophy, and it is an integral part of classical education that every one should sooner or later—later rather than sooner—devise a solution of his own. The examples which we shall select are from Greece more often than from Rome.

✓ If one were to endeavour to express in a single word the fundamental difference between ancient and modern ways of thinking, one might say that the keynote of the former is synthesis, that of the latter analysis. The ancients delighted in wholes ; the moderns delight in resolving a whole into its component parts. It is only another way of expressing the same essential difference to say that Greek antiquity was on the whole imaginative, while modern life is scientific in the main. Now the greatest whole which it is possible to conceive is the totality of things, composed of the ego and the non-ego, of internal and external nature, of the Individual and the World. As regards the relation between these two, the Greeks regarded Man and Nature as united in a far closer union than we do now. Nature was to them no step-mother, no tigress, "red in tooth and claw," no inhuman force to be fought against, but a mother, a beneficent power with whom we should cooperate against the forces that make for misery and sin. It was not, we may well believe, to pray to his goddess mother only that Achilles turned to the sea for comfort :

αὐτὰρ Ἀχιλλεύς

δακρύσας ἐτάρων ἄφαρ ἔξετο νόσφι λιασθεὶς

θῶν' ἐφ' ἁλὸς πολιῆς, ὁρώων ἐπὶ οἶνοπα πόντον¹:

the ἀνήμερον γέλασμα of the infinite waters soothed and consoled his troubled heart. Nothing could illustrate more finely the Greek sentiment of kinship—if we may say so—with the sea than Simonides' picture of Danae and her babe cast adrift upon the stormy waves. The words of Danae are full of peace and quiet faith: fear is the least of her emotions. Hear what she says, addressing her child:—

ἄλμαν δ' ὑπερθεν τεᾶν κομᾶν βαθεῖαν

παριόντος κύματος οὐκ ἀλέγεις, οὐδ' ἀνέμων

φθόγγον, πορφυρέαισιν

κείμενος ἐν χλανίσῳ, καλὸν πρόσωπον.

... ..

κέλομαι δ' εὐδὲ βρέφος, εὐδέτω δὲ πόντος,

εὐδέτω δ' ἄμετρον κακόν.

μεταιβολία δέ τις φανείη, Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἐκ σέθεν.

ὅττι δὲ θαρσαλέον ἔπος

εὔχομαι νόσφιν δίκας, σύγγνωθί μοι².

“Sleep, my babe, and sleep, the sea”! The sympathy of human with external nature was never more touchingly expressed. And what shall we say of Earth, the Mother? The elder Pliny³, in one of the noblest passages in the whole range of Latin literature, has interpreted for us the ancient feeling of love and affection for the mother who feeds and sustains us during life, and recalls us to her arms at death: “Sequitur terra, cui uni rerum naturae partium eximia propter merita cognomen indidimus maternae venerationis. Sic hominum illa, ut caelum dei, quae nos nascentes excipit, natos alit semelque editos sustinet semper, novissime complexa gremio iam a reliqua natura abdicatos, tum maxime ut mater operiens, nullo magis

¹ Homer, *Iliad* I 348—350.

² Simonides 37.

³ *Hist. Nat.* II 63.

sacra merito quam quo nos quoque sacros facit, etiam monumenta ac titulos gerens nomenque prorogans nostrum et memoriam extendens contra brevitatem aevi, cuius numen ultimum iam nullis precamur irati grave, tanquam nesciamus hanc esse solam quae nunquam irascatur homini. Aquae subeunt in imbres, rigescunt in grandines, tumescunt in fluctus, praecipitantur in torrentes : aer densatur nubibus, furit procellis ; at haec benigna, mitis, indulgens, ususque mortalium semper ancilla, quae coacta generat, quae sponte fundit, quos odores saporisque, quos sucos, quos tactus, quos colores !” “Tum maxime ut mater operiens,” “then most of all like a mother covering us”—do not these words remove Death’s sting? ὁ δὲ μετὰ γήρως ἰὼν ἐπὶ τέλος κατὰ φύσιν ἀπονώτατος τῶν θανάτων καὶ μᾶλλον μεθ’ ἡδονῆς γιγνόμενος ἢ λύπης¹—death in the course of nature is accompanied rather by pleasure than by pain. The wearied child returns to his mother’s arms at evening :

Ἔσπερε, πάντα φέρεις,
φέρεις δὲν, φέρεις αἶγα, φέρεις ματέρι παῖδα².

But such a picture of Death, beautiful as it is, was rare among the Greeks. We may welcome the God when he comes as the natural evening of a happy day ; the miserable may pray for him to come “with healing in his wings,” as in the touching lines of Aeschylus³:

ὦ θάνατε παιάν, μή μ’ ἀτιμάσῃς μολεῖν.
μόνος γὰρ εἰ σὺ τῶν ἀνηκέστων κακῶν
ιατρός, ἄλγος δ’ οὐδὲν ἄπτεται νεκροῦ.

But how seldom does Death delay his advent till the natural bourn !

Modo pueros, modo adulescentes in cursu a tergo insequens
Necopinantes adsecuta est⁴.

¹ Plato, Timaeus 81 E.

² Sappho 95.

³ Frag. 244.

⁴ ap. Cicero Tuscul. Disp. I 94.

Nor could the Hellenic joy of living always look forward with resignation even to the natural term of life. The well-known lines attributed to Moschus represent the usual Greek feeling about death:

αἰαὶ ταὶ μαλάχαι μὲν ἐπὰν κατὰ κᾶπον ὄλωνται,
 ἡδὲ τὰ χλωρὰ σέλινα τό τ' εὐθαλὲς οὖλον ἀνηθον,
 ὕστερον αὖ ζῶντι καὶ εἰς ἔτος ἄλλο φύοντι·
 ἄμμες δ' οἱ μεγάλοι καὶ καρτεροὶ οἱ σοφοὶ ἄνδρες,
 ὁππότε πρᾶτα θάνωμες, ἀνάκοι ἐν χθονὶ κόιλα
 εὐδομες εὖ μάλα μακρὸν ἀτέρμονα νήγρετον ὕπνον.

The Greeks murmured at death because it seemed to involve a breach with the order of nature. The leaf dies, but the soul still lives, and clothes itself in another body in the spring; but man perishes, or if his soul survives in Hades, it is but a shadow in shadow-land, a prisoner sighing for freedom and the light of day¹. The dead Achilles was but the mouthpiece of Greek feeling when he said²:

μὴ δὴ μοι θάνατόν γε παραύδα, φαίδιμ' Ὀδυσσεῦ.
 βουλοίμην κ' ἐπάρουρος ἑὼν θητεῖμεν ἄλλω
 ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἀκλήρῳ, ᾧ μὴ βίοςτος πολὺς εἴη,
 ἥ πᾶσιν νεκύεσσι καταφθιμένουσιν ἀνάσσειν.

But do not let us call the Greeks melancholy on this account; it is easy to exaggerate what is called their melancholy. Their repugnance at death is the measure of their optimism and love of life. A Greek could hardly have written the exquisite lines of Keats, in the "Ode to a Nightingale":

¹ It is interesting here to note how the theory of transmigration (involving a return to life upon the earth, the soul clothing itself in a new body as the tree puts forth new leaves)—the form in which the doctrine of immortality impressed itself upon the deeper religious and philosophical feeling of the Greeks—implies a reconciliation with the order of Nature as seen in the life of plants.

² Od. xi 488—491.

Darkling I listen; and for many a time
 I have been half in love with easeful Death,
 Call'd him soft names in many a mused rhyme,
 To take into the air my quiet breath;
 Now more than ever seems it rich to die,
 To cease upon the midnight with no pain,
 While thou art pouring forth thy soul in ecstasy!
 Still would'st thou sing, and I have ears in vain,
 To thy high requiem become a sod.

ὦ Σόλων, Σόλων, Ἕλληνες ἀεὶ παῖδές ἐστε, γέρων δὲ Ἕλλην οὐκ ἔστιν, said the Egyptian priest¹. It was the eternal boyhood of the Greeks that made them shrink from death as something almost contrary to Nature.

Up to the present point, we have dealt with the Greek conception of Nature and natural forces as personified, perhaps, but not as deified. But to the common people and the philosophers alike, Nature was divine. The popular imagination peopled earth and sea and sky with multitudinous gods and goddesses, the personification of natural forces, but did not unify them in the conception of a single all-embracing Deity. Throughout Greek literature, on the other hand, or at all events in the best Greek literature which survives, there runs an undercurrent of monotheism, and the philosophers loved to represent the totality of Nature's forces as the one and only God. And as God is good, so likewise is Nature: ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις, says Aristotle², οὐδὲν μάτην ποιοῦσιν. Evil is not natural, but unnatural: οὐδὲν τῶν παρὰ φύσιν καλόν³. It is the background of Necessity or Fate which throws into relief the smiling face of Nature⁴. And what the Greeks believed of Nature as a whole, they believed of Human Nature. Man's

¹ Timaeus 22 B.

² De Caelo 271^a 33.

³ Ar. Pol. 1325^b 10.

⁴ ib. 1255^b 3. Cf. de Caelo 286^a 19 ἑκστασίς τίς ἐστιν ἐν τῇ γενέσει τὸ παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν.

nature is not corrupt, not fallen, not degraded: there is no such thing as 'Original Sin': there is no cleft between the human and the divine, no aching sense of sin, no need of a reconciliation with God: ἐν ἀνδρῶν, ἐν θεῶν γένος· ἐκ μιᾶς δὲ πνέομεν ματρὸς ἀμφότεροι¹. Or, as Heraclitus put it²: τί δαὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι; θεοὶ θνητοί. τί δαὶ οἱ θεοί; ἄνθρωποι ἀθάνατοι. The most genuinely Greek expression of the ethical end is 'the life according to Nature': the highest practical expression of Greek religion is—as it is well expressed by Zeller—'to do to the glory of God that which is according to our own nature.'

It is unnecessary to dwell at length upon the contrast between such views and those under whose influence we live. *ταλαίπωρος ἐγὼ ἄθρωπος*, cries St Paul³, τίς με ῥύσεται ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου; We can hear the birth-cry of a new religion in these words. Nature and man have strayed from God: Christianity will lead them back. οἶδαμεν γὰρ ὅτι πάντα ἡ κτίσις συστενάζει καὶ συνωδίνει ἄχρι τοῦ νῦν⁴: but Θεὸς ἦν ἐν Χριστῷ κόσμον καταλλάσσων ἑαυτῷ⁵. The contrast between Paganism and Christianity could not be more strikingly expressed than in the words of St Paul⁶ ἐνδημοῦντες ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐκδημοῦμεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Κυρίου, or in those of St James⁷ ἡ φιλία τοῦ κόσμου ἐχθρα τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστίν. Christianity looks for a city, not on earth, but in the heavens: ἡμῶν γὰρ τὸ πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανοῖς ὑπάρχει⁸: a city wherein Justice dwells: καινοὺς δὲ οὐρανοὺς καὶ γῆν καινὴν...προδοκῶμεν, ἐν οἷς δικαιοσύνη κατοικεῖ⁹. In order to become a citizen of this Ideal City—τὴν πόλιν τὴν ἁγίαν Ἱερουσαλὴμ καινὴν which the author of the Revelation¹⁰ saw καταβαίνουσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ἡτοιμασμένην ὡς νύμφην κεκοσμημένην τῷ ἀνδρὶ αὐτῆς—it is necessary to enslave the

¹ Pind. Nem. vi. 1.

² Frag. 67 ed. Bywater.

³ Romans vii. 24.

⁴ Romans viii. 22.

⁵ 2 Cor. v. 19.

⁶ 2 Cor. v. 6.

⁷ iv. 4.

⁸ Philipp. iii. 20.

⁹ 2 Pet. iii. 13.

¹⁰ xxi. 2.

body and make free the soul: ἀλλ' ὑπωπιάζω μου τὸ σῶμα, says St Paul¹, καὶ δουλαγωγῶ, μήπως—αὐτὸς ἀδόκιμος γένωμαι. What a contrast to the Hellenic attitude is here! μὴ θησαυρίζετε ἰμῖν θησαυροὺς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς...θησαυρίζετε δὲ ἰμῖν θησαυροὺς ἐν οὐρανῷ². What meaning would this sublime exhortation have conveyed to an ordinary Athenian in the time of Pericles? The Hellenic vista—

ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἀνδρὶ θνητῷ,
δεύτερον δὲ φῦαν καλὸν γενέσθαι,
τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως,
καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἡβᾶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων³,—

ends where the full fruition of the Christian begins—at death. The correct appreciation of this fundamental contrast is one of the most potent factors which can be conceived in the promotion of intellectual life and sympathy⁴.

Let us take another illustration from the sphere of Man's duty to his fellows. The traditional morality of Greece laid it down as a rule of conduct to do good to friends, and evil to foes. We except for the present the protests raised by Plato and one or two others⁵ against this precept of Greek morality ;

¹ 1 Cor. ix. 27.

² St Matth. vi. 19.

³ Ath. xv. 694 e: cf. Plato Gorg. 451 E.

⁴ It is of course easy to find in Socrates, Plato, and Euripides, and sporadically elsewhere, anticipations of the Pauline doctrine of Man and Nature. The movement that began with Socrates—in so far as any great movement can be said to have a beginning—prepared the way for the new era. But even in Plato the contrast is conspicuous. The μελέτη θανάτου, for example, of the Phaedo is less of a religious than an intellectual aspiration. Plato's 'study of death' is inspired by the consciousness of ignorance, and the desire of knowledge, St Paul's by the sense of sin and the desire of holiness. With Plato the moral exaltation was a result of the intellectual; with St Paul it was the primary and immediate aim.

⁵ Pittacus, according to Diog. Laert. i. 4. 78, said φίλον μὴ λέγειν κακῶς, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ ἔχθρόν. Plato's protest is contained in Rep. i 335 B foll., in the Gorgias, and elsewhere.

in this, as in many other matters, Plato's teaching is the morning twilight of a brighter day. Solon¹ prays that he may be 'sweet to friends, and bitter to foes': Pindar² is fain 'to love a friend,' but ποτὶ ἐχθρόν ᾗτ' ἐχθρὸς ἐὼν λύκοιο δίκην ὑποθέσσομαι, ἀλλ' ἄλλοτε πατέων ὁδοῖς σκολιαῖς: and Socrates in the Memorabilia³ represents this principle as the prevailing morality of Greece. Set against this the Sermon on the Mount: ἀγαπάτε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑμῶν, καλῶς ποιείτε τοῖς μισοῦσιν ὑμᾶς, εὐλογεῖτε τοὺς καταρωμένους ὑμῖν, καὶ προσεύχεσθε ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐπηρεάζοντων ὑμᾶς⁴: or compare it with the picture of Christian ethics in St Paul⁵: εὐλογεῖτε τοὺς διώκοντας ὑμᾶς· εὐλογεῖτε, καὶ μὴ καταρᾶσθε· χαίρειν μετὰ χαιρόντων, καὶ κλαίειν μετὰ κλαιόντων... ἐὰν οὖν πεινᾷ ὁ ἐχθρός σου, ψώμιζε αὐτόν· ἐὰν διψᾷ, πότιζε αὐτόν· τοῦτο γὰρ πσιῶν ἄνθρακας πυρὸς σωρεύσεις ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ. μὴ νικῶ ὑπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἀλλὰ νίκα ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸ κακόν. No contrast could be more emphatic or significant. It is impossible to realise the contradiction at all without receiving an intellectual stimulus: it is impossible fully to appreciate its meaning without a quickening of intellectual sympathy.

The examples which we have selected belong to the sphere of religion and ethics, but it would be easy to find instances in which the study of Greek antiquity in its psychology, its political theory and practice, its literature, its art, presents us with suggestive and stimulating contrasts to modern fashions and beliefs. In their psychological attitude, for example, the Greeks, true to their unifying instinct, recoiled from the habit of analysing the human mind with which we are familiar in the present day. Intellect, Will, and Emotion were often unified by the Greeks in Intellect. As a result of this unification, morality, which we now regard as, primarily at all events, a condition of the will, was apt to be identified with an intellectual state. An inevitable

¹ Frag. 13. 5.

² Pyth. II 83.

³ II. 3. 14.

⁴ St Luke vi. 27.

⁵ Romans xii. 9—21, esp. vv. 14, 15, 20, 21.

consequence of this was the exaltation of the rational or intellectual side of human life over the emotional and moral. In modern Teutonic races the tendency is the other way. We need not dwell upon the striking differences between the political ideals and institutions of the ancients and our own. Their conception of the City State with all that it involved, and, in particular, the influence of this ideal in determining the relation between the individual and the State, these, and many other less fundamental contrasts, readily suggest themselves. Nor is it otherwise with ancient literature and art. It would be an excellent educative discipline to institute a comparison between the Classical and Romantic drama, or between Greek and English lyric poetry, or between ancient and modern ways of writing history. The study of ancient art and archæology is not a liberal education unless it is pursued with the ulterior object of apprehending the spirit of Antiquity in its likeness and unlikeness to that of Christendom. The Parthenon should be interpreted by—shall we say?—Lincoln Cathedral: Niobe weeping for her children by the Pietà of Michelangelo.

Enough has been said to indicate generally the way in which the study of classical literature and life fulfils the first requisite of a liberal education by creating and fostering the spirit of intellectual sympathy. It remains for us to shew how the discipline of ancient civilisation should mould and fashion the character.

To analyse the ideal man—the true likeness of Humanity, τὸ ἀνδρείκελον, ὃ δὴ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐκάλεσεν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγιγνόμενον θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοείκελον¹—is πλέον ἢ κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν ὁρμὴν²: but we can all recognise two elements of character, the blending of which in due proportion is as rare as it is splendid. The one we call by such names as steadiness, strength, sobriety, self-control, the habit of obeying law; the other is called intellectual acuteness, originality, independence

¹ Plato, Republic VI 501 B.

² *ibid.* 506 E.

of mind, the capacity of making law. These are the two great factors which unite to form the characters of us all. Among Englishmen it is perhaps the steady element which predominates. This element is magnificent in action, after it has been told what to do, but, when confronted with an idea, it is apt to yawn, or to look at its watch, being, to put it somewhat bluntly, in the judgment at least of Frenchmen, a trifle stupid. In its noblest forms this virtue of character will make a school-boy lead a forlorn hope upon the battlefield, and meet a glorious death with the cry of *Floreat Etona* still ringing on his lips. In its degenerate forms it causes men to prize the body above the soul, and "esteem gymnastic more than music¹."

The second factor in character, that which we have called originality, is less plentiful in the majority of men. It is often found in inverse proportion to the element of steadiness, and that is why genius—so we are wont to say—is often erratic and unstable. It is in virtue of this element that discoveries are made, and the limits of human knowledge extended; it is this that is the parent of the highest flights of poetry; it is this that founds religions and sways mankind, as the moon regulates the tides, with the magic force of an idea. But in its degraded forms, and when it is wrongly educated, it sinks into petty sophistry, makes havoc of great names, and convinces itself and others that the worse cause is the better, and so becomes a curse to the society wherein it appears. *Corruptio optimi pessima*.

φιλοσοφείν ἄνευ μαλακίας—this is indeed the end. In the *Politicus*² Plato wished to secure the presence of these two sides of character in children by intermarriages between men and women in whom the opposing elements predominated. It is wholly in the spirit of Plato's teaching to regard the ideal character as itself the product of the spiritual union of these two elements within the soul; and it is such a spiritual union

¹ Plato, Rep. VIII 548 C.

² 310.

that every attempt to educate the character should endeavour to effect.

We have still to shew that the study of classical antiquity tends to cherish and to unify these two sides of the ideal man.

To know a thing, in the fullest sense of the term, is to become like the thing we know. Knowledge is the assimilation of subject and object. This is the teaching of Christianity and Platonism alike: the one tells us that to know God is to be assimilated to His glorious image, the other that the knowledge of the Idea of Good or God, which is the ultimate end, involves *ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν*¹. To know the best and highest in Greece and Rome is therefore to make the virtues of antiquity our own. For the purpose of educating the character by means of classical study, whatever is not best in ancient life and thought should, in the first instance at least, be ignored.

What then is the best of Greece, what is the best of Rome? To put the matter briefly, the genius of Greece was speculative, that of Rome was practical. The desire of knowledge, scepticism in its true and noble sense of searching after truth, is the dowry of ancient Greece; strength and self-control, obedience and law belong to Rome. Full well did Virgil say:

Excudent alii spirantia mollius aera,
Credo equidem, vivos ducent de marmore voltus;
Orabunt causas melius, caelique meatus
Describent radio, et surgentia sidera dicent:
Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento;
Hae tibi erunt artes, pacisque imponere morem,
Parcere subiectis, et debellare superbos².

Greece is in very truth the Mother of Ideas! How many seeds has she sown whose flowers and fruit delight and sustain us now! But the Greeks were relatively weak in action, because they knew not how to combine, since it is of the essence of genius to be individual. They could not translate into practice the ideas which they created; this honour was

¹ Theact. 176 B.

² Aeneid vi 848—854.

reserved for Christianity and Rome. The lofty ideals of morality which the Greek philosophers constructed reappear in Christian ethics, intensified, it is true, and intertwined more closely with the affections and the will, but easy to recognise, and in this profoundly human form sway still more powerfully the hearts of men. καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν¹. In Rome, thanks to the national virtues of courage, and patience, and submission to authority, the ideas of law and government enunciated by Greek thinkers were translated into action, losing, perhaps, somewhat in the process, since practice is everywhere less perfect than theory, but keeping alive the sacred flame of civilisation, and spreading the *pax Romana* over the face of the Roman world.

And now let us sum up. The study of Classical literature and life is a liberal education because it enlarges our intellectual horizon, and promotes intellectual sympathy by the electric shock of contradiction and the activity thus set up. It is a liberal education, in the second place, because it moulds the will and character no less than the intellect. As the student learns more of Greek life and thought, he should become more independent and more manly, not driven to and fro by every wind of doctrine, but honestly striving to think things out for himself, and building his faith on the sure ground of knowledge. In one word, he will love *Truth* more. As his knowledge of the life and language of Rome advances, he will become more patient and more courageous, he will learn "to scorn delights and live laborious days," he will become more loyal to himself, his country, and his faith, and become both a better citizen and a better man. In one word, he will love *Law* more.

The writer has spoken seriously, perhaps unduly so, upon this subject of classical study, because he feels that the issue is a great one: μέγας ὁ ἀγών, μέγας, οὐχ ὅσος δοκεῖ. It seems to

¹ St John i. 14.

him a grave misfortune that any one should study classics without trying sooner or later to form some notion of what the study means. Every student and exponent of antiquity should frame his theory for himself, otherwise its educational value is but little. The present essay is only a *ἰπόμνημα τῷ ταῦτὸν ἔχονς μετιόντι*¹. The beginner in classical study should be content at first to believe—*δεῖ γὰρ πιστεύειν τοὺς μαθόνοντας*, as Aristotle remarks—that there *is* a “beatific vision.” Such a faith will animate and inspire the daily routine, and make the meanest particle breathe and live. He will begin by studying the body, if we may say so, of Greek thought, the beautiful language which is but the outward expression of inward and more spiritual beauty: *ἁρμονίη γὰρ ἀφανὴς φανερῆς κρείττων*. From the contemplation of bodily beauty he will rise to that of spiritual, and the soul of antiquity will reveal herself to him in the thoughts of ancient poets and philosophers and men of science, in ancient laws and institutions, in the immortal creations of ancient art and architecture. He will then recognise in the words of Plato² *ὅτι πᾶν τὸ κάλλος αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ξυγγενές ἐστιν*, and “facing the full Sea of Beauty and looking thereon, he will beget out of bountiful Philosophy many beautiful and lofty conceptions and thoughts.” The Sea of Beauty stretches wide, its waves unharvested as ever. We have merely stood upon the shore; he who scales the still snow citadels around it will see farther, but even he will not see all.

‘Nay, come up hither....

Unto the furthest flood-brim look with me;
Then reach on with thy thought till it be drown’d.
Miles and miles distant though the last line be,
And though thy soul sail leagues and leagues beyond,
Still leagues beyond those leagues there is more sea.’

¹ Plato, *Phaedr.* 276 D.

² *Symp.* 210 C—D.

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